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Abstract—Anonymity networks hide user identities with the help of relayed anonymity routers. However, the state-of-the-art anonymity
networks do not provide an effective trust model. As a result, users cannot circumvent malicious or vulnerable routers, thus making
them susceptible to malicious router based attacks (e.g., correlation attacks). In this paper, we propose a novel social network based
trust model to help anonymity networks circumvent malicious routers and obtain secure anonymity. In particular, we design an input
independent fuzzy model to determine trust relationships between friends based on qualitative and quantitative social attributes, both of
which can be readily obtained from existing social networks. Moreover, we design an algorithm for propagating trust over an anonymity
network. We integrate these two elements in STor, a novel social network based Tor. We have implemented STor by modifying the Tor’s
source code and conducted experiments on PlanetLab to evaluate the effectiveness of STor. Both simulation and PlanetLab experiment
results have demonstrated that STor can achieve secure anonymity by establishing trust-based circuits in a distributed way. Although
the design of STor is based on Tor network, the social network based trust model can be adopted by other anonymity networks.
Index Terms—Social Network, Anonymous Communication, Tor, Fuzzy Model
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1 INTRODUCTION
Anonymity networks, which hide user identity by using re-
layed anonymity routers, play a very important role in protect-
ing user privacy. However, without a trust model, the state-of-
the-art anonymity networks, such as [1]–[11], are vulnerable to
various malicious router based attacks [12], [13]. Therefore,
introducing an effective trust model to anonymity networks
remains a critically important problem. In this paper, we
propose a novel social network based trust model and apply it
to the Tor network [8], which is one of the most dominant
low-latency anonymity network today [13] and is used by
around 250,000 users [14], [15]. Although the design and
implementation of the proposed trust model is based on Tor,
this model can be easily applied to other anonymity networks.
A Tor user accesses Internet services through dynamically
encrypted circuits. Each circuit usually consists of three Tor
routers, preventing an attacker from tracking back a user
and protecting the private content through nested encryptions.
However, without a trust-based onion routing algorithm, a
number of malicious router based attacks on Tor have success-
fully demonstrated that Tor’s anonymity could be hampered
if one or more Tor routers in a circuit become malicious.
Examples of such attacks include correlation attacks [16]–[21],
congestion attacks [22], disclosure attacks [23], and latency
based client location attacks [24].
Tor [25] uses guard routers at the entry point and selects exit
routers according to the exit node policy to prevent malicious
routers. Moreover, Tor relies on a group of directory servers
to check each router’s credibility according to its uptime
[25]–[27]. These mechanisms, however, are insufficient for
trust-based anonymous communication due to the following
reasons. First, checking router identities based on uptime
alone can be easily bypassed by an attacker. For example, an
attacker can set up a malicious router and operate it normally
for a period of time to gain the directory servers’ trust.
Second, without trust-based routing algorithm, Tor basically
considers every candidate router with the same trust. Thus,
Tor is unable to select routers based on their capability of
providing secure anonymity when forming the circuits. Third,
the central directory servers are potential targets of various
attacks, notably targeted intrusion, IP address blacklisting, and
DDoS attacks. For example, network wardens (e.g., The Great
Firewall of China [28]) can block Tor networks by blacklisting
directory servers. The private bridges made available since
version 0.2.1 [29], which are designed to help users affected
by the blocking, are often set up in an ad hoc manner. Fourth,
the existing Tor architecture is not scalable, because a user is
required to maintain up-to-date information about all the Tor
routers [30].
To effectively evade the malicious router based attacks, we
propose a novel trust-based anonymity network, called STor
(Social network based Tor), which employs social networks to
help users circumvent malicious routers. STor provides secure
anonymity to its users by “overlaying” social networks on top
of the current Tor infrastructure. More precisely, STor uses the
existing trust relationships from real-world social networks to
determine a trust score for each router. As the trust information
is based on the router’s owner, STor is able to identify not only
malicious routers, but also the routers that are vulnerable to
being compromised. A STor user thus selects a router based
on the trust score computed from the relationship between
the user and the router’s owner. In particular, the user will
exclude a router which is owned by someone who is not
in his friendship circle (i.e., no relationship with the user).
Another advantage of using social networks is to eliminate
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2the need for the central directory servers. Therefore, STor
can operate as a pure distributed system to provide trust-
based anonymity services. Finally, STor is scalable, because
each user is only required to maintain up-to-date information
about their friends which is only a subset of the entire Tor
network. However, the uncertainty and vagueness of the real-
world social networks make the relationships between friends
imprecise [31], [32], thus designing an effective trust model
based on social networks to facilitate anonymity networks is
not trivial.
In summary, we have made three important contributions in
this paper:
1) We introduce a novel social network based trust model
to further secure anonymity networks. In particular, we
have designed STor, the Tor network enhanced by the
social network based trust model. STor users thus select
routers by taking into account their trust in those routers.
2) We have designed an input independent fuzzy model
to handle the uncertainty and vagueness of social rela-
tionships, thus determining the direct trust according to
various social attributes in different social networks. We
have also developed an algorithm to propagate indirect
trust to a friend’s friends which form a friendship circle.
Both of them are the major elements in STor.
3) We have implemented STor by modifying Tor’s source
code and performed a comprehensive evaluation of the
effectiveness of STor in both simulation and experiments
over PlanetLab platform. The experimental results show
that STor can effectively establish trust-based circuits
in a decentralized fashion and help users obtain secure
anonymity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents the threat model considered in this paper. Section
3 explains how trust relationships in social networks are
used in the design of STor, including the quantification and
propagation of trust. Section 4 elaborates the qualification
process of various social attributes by using a novel input
independent fuzzy model. Section 5 presents both simulation
and PlanetLab experiment results to evaluate STor. Section 6
reviews related work, followed by a conclusion in Section 7.
2 THREAT MODEL
The architecture of Tor is illustrated on the left side of
Fig. 1. When Tor users request anonymity service to visit a
remote server, they ask the directory servers for a set of Tor
routers that have already been determined as trustworthy due
to their uptime to build encrypted circuits. After establishing
the circuit, the Tor user sends data to the local Onion Proxy,
which subsequently forwards the data to the remote server
through the circuit. To provide sufficient anonymity, the circuit
changes every ten minutes. In the Tor network, a larger number
of candidate routers usually imply better anonymity service.
We refer the anonymity service that is determined by the
number of candidate routers to as baseline anonymity, because
it provides the necessary (but not sufficient) mechanisms for
anonymity communication.
Directory servers were originally used for defeating Sybil
attacks [33], which generate a huge number of fake identities
to attack distributed systems. However, attackers can easily
obtain the Tor network’s trust, as the directory servers verify
router identities only based on their uptimes. Moreover, since
the directory servers are publicly accessible, attackers could
compromise them through DDoS, IP/DNS blocking, and tar-
geted intrusion. To evade these attacks, a trust-based routing
algorithm must be able to
• Verify a Tor router’s identity using a comprehensive set
of parameters, including not only the router’s uptime, but
also its owner’s reputation,
• Enable users to take trust into consideration when select-
ing routers to establish circuits, and
• Manage trust in a distributed way without being threat-
ened by Sybil attacks.
STor uses the trust relationship from existing social net-
works to manage trust in the Tor network. As many recent
studies have demonstrated that social networks can effectively
help distributed systems evade Sybil attacks [34]–[40], STor
can therefore satisfy the three requirements and provide secure
anonymity by enhancing the baseline anonymity with the
capability of circumventing malicious routers based on a trust
model.
As STor determines the trust relationship between users
based on existing social networks, attacks targeting social
networks, like [41], [42], may compromise STor. In the paper,
it is therefore essential to assume that the social network pro-
vides sufficient security for establishing trust among friends.
In particular, we make two assumptions for the design of STor:
• All entities in social networks can authenticate informa-
tion about their friends.
• Existing social networks have comprehensive mecha-
nisms to avoid leaking of private information, such as an
entity’s friendship circles and the IP addresses of their
routers.
The first assumption is to guarantee that the trust relationship
obtained from social networks is reliable for computing the
trust of each router. The second assumption is to prevent the
trust relationships from being leaked to the public domain.
If an attacker were aware of an entity’s trust relationships,
he could compromise the entity’s anonymity by tracking the
routers of the entity’s friends.
The right side of Fig. 1 illustrates the architecture of STor.
Any router included in a circuit must be owned by the user’s
friends or friends of their friends from social networks A and
B. Furthermore, friends with a higher trust is more likely to
be selected for the circuit formation. For instance, router ³, a
malicious router, is excluded when circuits are built because
its owner, the human entity ³, is neither a friend of user ¬
nor his friends’ friend. Using this approach, STor can allocate
trust-based circuits in a decentralized manner without the need
of directory servers and exclude (potentially) malicious routers
with the help of trust relationships from real-world social
networks.
For user ¬, some of their friends or some friends of friends
(e.g., ¯, °) belong to both social networks A and B, which
3Directory Servers
Tor User
Web Server
Tor Network
Tor
Tor Proxy
Tor User
Tor Proxy
Social Network A Social Network B
Web Server
STor
Tor Network
②
②
③
③
④
④
⑤
⑤
⑥
⑥
⑦
⑦
⑧
⑧
Tor Circuit
①
Directory Server Control Circuit Friendship Between Two Entities
①
Tor Routers Entities of STor User in Social NetworksMalicious Router
Fig. 1. Architecture of Tor and STor.
are considered as merged entities by STor. That is, STor can
manage trust relationships across multiple social networks.
Section 3.1 will further elaborate on this. Furthermore, each
entity can generally possess more than one router in STor and
access STor through multiple proxies. In the interest of clarity,
we consider in the rest of this paper only the case that each
user has a single router and uses a single proxy.
3 DESIGN OF STOR
STor, as a social network based Tor, harnesses the trust
relationship from existing real-world social networks to help
users obtain secure anonymity by using trust-based circuits.
This section addresses the challenges in the design of STor,
including the calculation of the direct and indirect trust,
using the trust relationship to facilitate router selection. We
also discuss the impacts on the performance and baseline
anonymity provided by Tor.
3.1 Modeling the trust relationship
We model the social structure of STor as a weighted directed
cyclic graph, G = 〈N,L〉, whose nodes represent human enti-
ties and directed links indicate their uni-directional friendships.
Each link has a trust value indicating the level of trust a
person places in their friend in STor. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
denote the set of human entities (i.e., nodes on the graph) and
L = {(i→ j), i, j ∈ N} the set of uni-directional friendships
between human entities (i.e., links on the graph), where i→ j
indicates that entity i trusts entity j.
As discussed in Section 2, STor admits trust relationships
from multiple social networks. Therefore, we have G =
∪
Ss∈S
Gs = 〈 ∪
Ss∈S
Ns, ∪
Ss∈S
Ls〉, where, S = {Ss, s = 1, 2, . . .}
is the set of social networks used in STor. For a given social
network Ss, the subgraph Gs = 〈Ns,Ls〉 represents the
structure of Ss. Ns and Ls are the respective sets in Ss.
If entity i can reach entity j through an acyclic path
comprising r directed links in graph G, entity j belongs to
the r-hop friendship circle of entity i, denoted as Fi,r =
{q|p ∈ Fi,r−1, (p → q) ∈ L}. Fi,r has a recursive definition
with Fi,1 = {q|(i → q) ∈ L} as the base case. An entity
could be a member of multiple friendship circles of another
entity. The friendship circle of entity i is therefore given by
Fi = Fi,1∪Fi,2∪ . . .∪Fi,g , where g is the maximum number
of directed links between entity i and their friends. We use
||Fi|| to denote the number of entities in Fi. Obviously, Fi,1
includes entity i’s friends and Fi,r(r > 1) contains the friends
of i’s friends. Additionally, we define F si as the friendship
circle of entity i in social network Ss ∈ S and subsequently
Fi = ∪Ss∈SF
s
i .
Fig. 2 shows an example of the friendship circles for entity
1 which has a total of 12 friends and friends of friends. Four of
them are in their 1-hop friendship circle (i.e., friends), while
the rest are in their 2-hop friendship circle (i.e., friends of
friends). Each directed link is associated with a trust value,
which will be defined next.
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Fig. 2. Entity 1’s friendship circle.
3.2 Computing the direct trust
We define trust value as the degree of trust one entity assigns
to his friend directly, denoted as tv ∈ [0, 1]. Let tvi→j
represent the trust value entity i gives to j, j ∈ Fi,1. As each
entity can make friends in more than one social network, let
tvsi→j denote the trust value that entity i places in j in social
4network Ss. If entities i and j are friends in more than one
social network, the highest trust value will be used, that is,
tvi→j = max
(i→j)∈Ls,Ss∈S
tvsi→j .
The trust value tvsi→j can be computed based on quantitative
and qualitative social attributes. Quantitative social attributes
are quantifiable, such as the communication frequency be-
tween two friends and the duration of their friendship in the
social network. Higher communication frequency and longer
friendship generally result in a higher trust value. A Tor
router’s uptime is also considered as a quantitative social
attribute. Qualitative social attributes, on the other hand,
represent qualitative features, such as the relationship between
two people, and their majors and careers. For example, a
family member should receive more trust than a stranger, and
a friend with a major and a career in computer security should
receive additional trust.
In the real social networks, the relationships between friends
are imprecise because the environments are uncertainty and
vagueness [31], thus converting social attributes into a trust
value can be effectively handled by the fuzzy model [43],
which is especially useful for imprecise categories [32]. The
fuzzy model can help calibrate the measure of social trust by
using set membership relevant to substantive knowledge from
social attributes [32]. However, as there is a lack of quan-
tifiable units, the qualitative attributes, which are important
elements in STor, cannot be converted by using a fuzzy model
directly. To overcome this problem, we propose a novel input
independent fuzzy model to determine the trust value based
on both quantitative and qualitative social attributes. Section
4 details this fuzzy process.
3.3 Computing the indirect trust
In STor, the degree of indirect trust is computed through
trust propagation over the underlying friendship paths. Let
Pi→j = {Γci→j , c = 1, 2, . . . , C} be the set containing all the
friendship paths starting from entity i to entity j, where the
friendship path Γci→j = i→ h1 → . . .→ hr−1 → j indicates
trust propagation from entity i to their r-hop friend j through
intermediate friends h1, . . . , hr−1 and ||Pi→j || = C is the
number of paths in the set. For each Γci→j , a trust distance,
denoted as td(Γci→j), represents the degree of trust entity i
places in j over this path.
Since td(Γci→j) should be a non-increasing function of r,
we compute it by multiplying the trust value of each link:
td(Γci→j) = tvi→h1 × . . .× tvhr−1→j . (1)
Moreover, we define a trust score as the highest degree of trust
entity i can give to entity j, denoted as tsi⇒j , by considering
all possible friendship paths. Thus,
tsi⇒j = max∀Γci→j∈Pi→j
td(Γci→j). (2)
Fig. 3 illustrates an example of computing the trust value,
trust distance, and trust score. In this example, entity 5 belongs
to F1,1, F1,2, and F1,3 simultaneously and three different paths
connect entity 1 with entity 5: 1 → 5, 1 → 2 → 5, and
1 → 3 → 4 → 5. The trust score ts1⇒5 equals 0.648, which
is the maximum trust distance given by the last path.
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Fig. 3. An example for the trust value, trust distance, and
trust score.
The problem of calculating the trust score from each entity
to his friends can be formulated as a longest path problem
with a non-increasing distance function (i.e., Eq. (1)). It is
well known that the shortest path problem can be solved in
polynomial time when the distance function is non-decreasing
in a weighted directed cyclic graph [44]. Therefore, by con-
verting the distance function from non-decreasing to non-
increasing, the longest path problem in STor can be solved
efficiently by converted it into a shortest path problem. A
dynamic programming algorithm can subsequently be used to
solve this problem in polynomial time.
According to Eq. (1) and tv ∈ [0, 1], we have td ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore,
max
∀Γci→j∈Pi→j
td(Γci→j) ≡ 1− min∀Γci→j∈Pi→j
(1− td(Γci→j)).
Based on this, the definition of trust scores can be transformed
to tsi⇒j = 1 − min∀Γci→j∈Pi→j
(1 − td(Γci→j)). By defining
distrust distance as utd(Γci→j) = 1 − td(Γci→j), which is a
non-decreasing distance function, the longest trust distance
problem is converted to a shortest distrust distance problem.
The Fibonacci heap can be used to implement the typical
Dijkstra algorithm [45] to determine the ||Fi|| shortest paths
from each entity i to his friends and friends of friends (i.e.,
∀j ∈ Fi) with a time complexity of O(||Fi|| × log(||Fi||)).
3.4 Trust-based Onion Routing Algorithm
In Tor, directory servers select routers from the available ones
to construct circuits. Let bj denote the available bandwidth of
entity j. The probability of selecting router j is bj/
∑n
k=1 bk
[25] for n available routers. In contrast, entity i in STor can
only select Onion routers from candidates that are confined to
Fi and the probability of selecting router j (i.e., Prij) is
Prij =
(1− ω)× tsi⇒j + ω ×BWj∑
k∈Fi((1− ω)× tsi⇒k + ω ×BWk)
, (3)
where BWj = bj/maxx∈Fi(bx) is a normalized bandwidth
and ω ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter to balance the trust score with
bandwidth. A small ω gives more weight to the trust score,
whereas a large ω gives more weight to bandwidth. With this
new algorithm, the STor users can only select routers from
their friendship circle and have a high probability of choosing
routers with a high trust score.
53.5 Effects on Tor networks
3.5.1 Effect on performance
Although parameter ω in Eq. (3) can be increased to give a
high probability of connecting to routers with large bandwidth,
the candidate routers are still restricted to a user’s friendship
circle in STor, which is only a subset of the Tor network.
As a result, the circuit established in STor may not enjoy the
best performance, because other routers outside the friendship
circle cannot be used. This problem could be resolved by en-
couraging users to invite more friends to join STor, especially
those with high bandwidth routers. Particularly, STor can build
up a similar recruiting platform, like BRAIDS [46], to benefit
users who successfully request their friends to participate in
STor.
3.5.2 Effect on baseline anonymity
In anonymity networks, the baseline anonymity service can
be achieved by forming circuits from a large set of can-
didate routers. STor obtains secure anonymity by using the
trust-based routing algorithm to circumvent malicious routers.
However, the STor users can only select routers from their
friendship circle. As a result, the baseline anonymity could
be degraded. To abate this possible degradation, users are
encouraged to make more friends with existing users in STor
or introduce more outside friends to join STor. Enlarging
the friendship circle unfortunately may run into the risk of
including malicious routers, because it is more likely to include
friends with low trust. To address this problem, we use a
threshold, tsh, to filter out the friends with low trust scores.
If an entity’s trust score is lower than tsh, his router will
not be considered for circuit establishment. The friendship
circle is therefore refined to a trustworthy friendship circle
TFi = {j ∈ Fi, tsi⇒j ≥ tsh}, and ||TFi|| is the size of TFi.
4 DETERMINATION OF TRUST VALUE AC-
CORDING TO SOCIAL ATTRIBUTES
In Section 3.2 we derive an algorithm to merge trust values
from multiple social networks and mention the use of an
input independent fuzzy model to convert both quantitative and
qualitative attributes into a trust value in each social network.
This section details this process. Section 4.1 elucidates the
challenges of the conversion by using the traditional fuzzy
model. Section 4.2 highlights the advantages of the input
independent fuzzy model and demonstrates its theoretical
design. This model is subsequently applied to STor in Section
4.3. As an example, a real case for the conversion by using the
input independent fuzzy model is illustrated in Section 4.4.
4.1 Challenges in the use of traditional fuzzy model
In the social realm, as social environments are always uncer-
tainty and vagueness, the social relationships between friends
are imprecise [31]. The fuzzy model [43] is therefore an
appropriate technique to handle the conversion from social
attributes to the trust values [31].
Traditionally, the fuzzy model [43] includes various quanti-
tative input variables (i.e., called crisp inputs in [43]), each of
which is associated with a relevant input fuzzy set. Each input
fuzzy set consists of a group of qualitative values (i.e., called
linguistic values in [43]) and these values can be converted
into membership functions whose elements have degrees of
membership. An quantitative input variable can obtain their
membership grade from each membership function in their
relevant input fuzzy set. Each grade can be mapped to a
corresponding membership function in a corresponding output
fuzzy set specified by the fuzzy rules. Finally, the fuzzy model
uses defuzzification methods to determine quantitative outputs.
Note that the quantitative input variable and their relevant input
fuzzy set have to be related to the same property. For example,
if the quantitative input variable is a value of temperature, its
relevant input fuzzy set must be the qualitative description of
temperature.
To integrate the quantitative social attributes into the trust
value by the traditional fuzzy model, we can use their quan-
titative values as the quantitative input variables and design
an input fuzzy set with a set of reasonable membership
functions to represent imprecise categories for each quanti-
tative attribute. Unlike the quantitative attributes, the lack of
quantitative values make the qualitative social attributes hard
to be converted by using the traditional fuzzy model directly.
To overcome this challenge, we propose a novel fuzzy
model, called the input independent fuzzy model, to determine
social relationships. In this model, the quantitative input vari-
ables can obtain their membership grade over unrelated input
fuzzy sets (i.e., input independent). As a result, by allowing
quantitative social attributes to get their membership grade
over different qualitative social attributes, the trust value can
be determined based on both quantitative and qualitative social
attributes by using the input independent fuzzy model.
4.2 The input independent fuzzy model
The input independent fuzzy model considers each qualitative
social attribute as an input fuzzy set, and converts their
qualitative values to membership functions. By allowing the
quantitative social attributes to obtain their membership grade
over unrelated qualitative social attributes, a quantitative trust
value is yielded according to both qualitative and quantitative
social attributes.
Comparing with the traditional fuzzy model, there are three
major improvements in this new model, as shown in Fig. 4:
• The quantitative input variable can calculate their mem-
bership grade over unrelated input fuzzy sets that are
defined by qualitative social attributes (i.e., input inde-
pendent).
• The quantitative input variable can only obtain their
membership grade from an exclusively selected mem-
bership function in each input fuzzy set. This selected
membership function is specified by the qualitative value
of each qualitative social attribute.
• A density constant is introduced to balance the de-
fuzzification when different output membership functions
surround different sizes of area.
As a result, the input independent fuzzy model shows its
advantages for determining the trust value as follows.
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Fig. 4. Difference between the input independent fuzzy model and the traditional fuzzy model.
• This model is able to handle the uncertainty and vague-
ness of the social relationships, which are usual features
in the social realm [31], thus helping convert social
attributes into the trust value.
• With the help of quantitative social attributes, qualitative
social attributes can be converted by using this model.
Both quantitative and qualitative social attributes can thus
be used to determine the trust value simultaneously.
• This model is flexible as unlimited number of social
attributes can be taken into account. Moreover, the qual-
itative social attributes can define different number of
membership functions to implement different levels of
conversion accuracy from social attributes to the trust
value.
4.2.1 The quantitative input variable
We use E to denote the quantitative input variable in this model
and compute it based on all the quantitative social attributes.
In each social network, E is calculated as:
E = ∑
∀Ee∈E
(pie × E(Ee)),
where,
∑
∀Ee∈E
(pie) = 1,
E(Ee) ∈ [0, 1], pie ∈ [0, 1], e ∈ [1, 2, . . .].
(4)
E = {Ee, e ∈ [1, 2, 3, . . .]} represents the set of all the
quantitative social attributes in each social network and Ee
is the eth quantitative social attribute in E. E(Ee) is the
normalized quantified value of quantitative attribute Ee while
pie is the weight of Ee.
For example, in social network Ss, Esi→j(Ee) is used
to represent the quantifiable value of quantitative attribute
Ee between entity i and j ∈ F si . Thus their normalized
quantitative value Esi→j(Ee) can be calculated as E
s
i→j(Ee) =
Esi→j(Ee)/max
p∈F si
(Esi→p(Ee)), where, F si is the friendship circle
of entity i in social network Ss, as defined in Section 3.1.
4.2.2 The fuzzy sets
The input independent fuzzy model enables the ability to
calculate the membership of quantitative input variable over
unrelated input fuzzy sets, and use membership functions
to represent the qualitative values in each qualitative social
attribute. E can thus obtain their membership over any quali-
tative social attributes in each social network. More precisely,
each qualitative social attribute is defined as an input fuzzy
set and their qualitative values are converted into membership
functions, as:
I = ⋃
∀Ak∈A
IAk , IAk = {( IAkp , µIAkp (E) )},
µIAkp (E) = {E : I
Ak
p → [0, 1]},
where, Ak ∈ A, p ∈ [1, 2, . . .], E ∈ DIAkp ⊆ [0, 1],
(5)
where A = {Ak, k ∈ [1, 2, 3, . . .]} represents all the qualitative
social attributes in the considered social network. Ak is the
kth social attribute in A and IAk represents the input fuzzy
set of Ak. IAkp is the pth qualitative value of qualitative social
attribute Ak, while µIAkp (E) is their membership function that
can be used to map E to the degree of membership for this
qualitative social attribute. DIAkp is the definition domain of
the membership function µIAkp (E).
Unlike the input fuzzy sets, we have only one output fuzzy
set in the input independent fuzzy model. This output fuzzy
set is relevant to the quantitative output (i.e., trust value) but
includes various qualitative descriptions of it. We define the
output fuzzy set as:
O = {( Oq, µOq (tv) )}, µOq (tv) = {tv : Oq → [0, 1]},
where, q ∈ [1, 2, . . .], tv ∈ DOq ⊆ [0, 1], (6)
where Oq is the qth qualitative description of output fuzzy set
O and can be represented as a membership function, µOq (tv).
DOq is the definition domain of µOq (tv).
4.2.3 The fuzzy rules
The fuzzy logic rule for correlating the pth membership
function in the kth input set with a corresponding qth output
membership function is defined as:
Rule k.p
IF The Qualitative Value of Ak belongs to IAkp ,
THEN Trust Value is Oq .
For each qualitative social attribute Ak ∈ A, if its qualitative
value belongs to IAkp=pm , the corresponding fuzzy rule k.pm is
used to map IAkpm to Oqm . We call the fuzzy rule, k.pm which
is selected by the qualitative value of Ak, as the matched rule.
For each matched rule, the input membership grade µIAkpm
(E),
calculated according to the quantitative input variable E , can
be used to truncate the corresponding membership function in
the output fuzzy set. Thus, there is a truncated membership
function in the output domain for each qualitative social
attribute Ak, in which the input membership function is
7selected by the matched rule k.pm:
µk.pm(E , tv) =
{
µIAkpm
(E), µOqm (tv) ≥ µIAkpm (E)
µOqm (tv), µOqm (tv) < µIAkpm
(E)
where, E ∈ DIAkpm ⊆ [0, 1], tv ∈ DOqm ⊆ [0, 1].
(7)
4.2.4 The defuzzification process
In the defuzzification process, the output trust value tv∗(E)
is calculated as the center of mass of a shape. The shape
is surrounded by the union of the truncated membership
functions µk.pm(E , tv) for all the considered qualitative social
attributes Ak ∈ A and the tv axis in the output domain.
For each qualitative social attribute Ak=K , if its qualitative
value matches the rule K.pm, the positions in the tv axis
weighted by the masses of the truncated membership function
µK.pm(E , tv) can be computed as:
MPK.pm(E) =
∫ 1
tv=0
tv × ρq × µK.pm(E , tv)d(tv). (8)
and the total mass of this truncated membership function as:
MK.pm(E) =
∫ 1
tv=0
ρq × µK.pm(E , tv)d(tv). (9)
Therefore, tv∗(E) can be computed as the center of the mass
according to Greiner’s algorithm [47]:
tv∗(E) =
∑
Ak∈A
MPk.pm (E)∑
Ak∈A
Mk.pm (E) . (10)
Particularly, when only one social attribute AK is used, its
output trust value can be computed as:
tv∗k=K,p=pm(E) =
MPK.pm (E)
MK.pm (E) . (11)
Unlike the the center of gravity defuzzification algorithm
in the traditional fuzzy model [48], here a density constant
ρq , which is associated with each of the corresponding output
membership function µOq (tv), is introduced to the center of
mass algorithm in Eq. (8) and Eq. (9). ρq must satisfy the
following identical equation:∫ 1
tv=0
ρqx × µOqxd(tv) ≡
∫ 1
tv=0
ρqy × µOqy d(tv),
where, ∀Oqx ,Oqy ⊆ O.
(12)
This equation guarantees that all the output membership func-
tions provide the same weight to the final trust value tv∗(E).
As a larger E leads to a higher trust value, the fuzzy sets
and rules should be designed to let function tv∗(E) be non-
decreasing, thus the inequality Eq. (13) should be satisfied.
(tv∗(E))′ = d(tv∗(E))d(E) ≥ 0. (13)
4.3 Application in STor
In STor, each qualitative social attribute forms an input fuzzy
set, while only one output fuzzy set is used. Note that more
membership functions declarations in a fuzzy set can lead to
finer-grained quantitative conversion. In our model, STor can
be designed with different numbers of membership functions
in each input fuzzy set (i.e., the qualitative social attribute)
and output fuzzy set to achieve different levels of conversion
accuracy for the trust value when necessary. As a case study,
STor defines three membership functions for each input fuzzy
set and use five membership functions in the output set.
For each qualitative social attribute Ak, their qualitative
values, IAkp , are defined as:
IAkp =
 (POSITIV E)
k, p = 1
(NEUTRAL)k, p = 2
(NEGATIV E)k, p = 3
where, Ak ∈ A, p ∈ [1, 2, 3].
(14)
And the qualitative values of the output set, Oq , are:
Oq =

LARGEST, q = 1
LARGE, q = 2
NORMAL, q = 3
SMALL, q = 4
SMALLEST, q = 5
where, q ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
(15)
If the qualitative value of qualitative social attribute Ak be-
longs to (POSITIV E)k, it indicates that this value will cause
a large trust value. If the value belongs to (NEGATIV E)k,
a small trust value will be yielded. (NEUTRAL)k, unlike
the other two, will result in the intermediate trust value. In
the output set, both O1 = LARGEST and O2 = LARGE
indicate larger trust values but with different magnitudes. In
contrast, O4 = SMALL and O5 = SMALLEST reflect
different levels of small trust values.
Based on these definitions, following fuzzy rules for each
qualitative social attribute Ak are designed:
Rule k.1
IF The Qualitative Value of Ak belongs to IAk1 = POSITIV Ek,
THEN Trust Value is { i.O1 = LARGEST.
ii.O2 = LARGE.
Rule k.2IF The Qualitative Value of Ak belongs to I
Ak
2 = NEUTRAL
k,
THEN Trust Value is O3 = NORMAL.
Rule k.3
IF The Qualitative Value of Ak belongs to IAk3 = NEGATIV Ek,
THEN Trust Value is { i.O4 = SMALL.
ii.O5 = SMALLEST.
As there is a very strong link between triangular plots
and most forms of social attributes [32], STor employs the
triangular membership function definition [49] to declare
membership functions both in input and output fuzzy sets.
Since fuzzy rules map (POSITIV E)k to larger trust values
while (NEGATIV E)k to smaller ones, and considering
larger E yielding larger trust values, membership function
of (POSITIV E)k should be increasing when E increases
and that of (NEGATIV E)k needs to be decreasing. For
(NEUTRAL)k, their membership function is designed to
increases at first then goes down. By considering inequality
Eq. (13), we thus define the membership functions in input
fuzzy sets as follows:
µIAk1
(E) = E , E ∈ [0, 1],
µIAk2
(E) =
{ E , E ∈ [0, 0.5],
1− E , E ∈ [0.5, 1],
µIAk3
(E) = 1− E , E ∈ [0, 1].
(16)
Similarly, the membership functions in the output fuzzy sets
8Oq, q ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] are defined as:
µO1(tv) =
{
4× tv − 3, tv ∈ [0.75, 1],
0, tv ∈ others,
µO2(tv) =
 4× tv − 2, tv ∈ [0.5, 0.75],4− 4× tv, tv ∈ [0.75, 1],
0, tv ∈ others,
µO3(tv) =
 4× tv − 1, tv ∈ [0.25, 0.5],3− 4× tv, tv ∈ [0.5, 0.75],
0, tv ∈ others,
µO4(tv) =
 4× tv, tv ∈ [0, 0.25],2− 4× tv, tv ∈ [0.25, 0.5],
0, tv ∈ others,
µO5(tv) =
{
1− 4× tv, tv ∈ [0, 0.25],
0, tv ∈ others.
(17)
Fig. 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate the membership functions of O
and I in STor, respectively.
To meet the requirement of Eq. (12), ρq can be set as:
ρq =
{
2, q = 1, q = 5
1, q = 2, q = 3, q = 4.
(18)
Considering Eqs. (7-9), Eq. (11), and Eqs. (16-18), for
each qualitative social attribute Ak=K with each rule, K.1.i,
K.1.ii, K.2, K.3.i and K.3.ii,MPK.pm(E),MK.pm(E) and
tv∗k=K,p=pm(E) can be calculated as follows. Appendix A
details the calculation process.
MPK.1.i(E) = − 148 (E3 + 9E2 − 21E), E ∈ [0, 1],MPK.1.ii(E) = − 316 (E2 − 2E), E ∈ [0, 1],{ MPK.2(E) = − 18 (E2 − 2E), E ∈ [0, 0.5],MPK.2(E) = − 18 (E2 − 1), E ∈ [0.5, 1],MPK.3.i(E) = − 116 (E2 − 1), E ∈ [0, 1],MPK.3.ii(E) = − 148 (E3 − 1), E ∈ [0, 1],
(19)
MK.1.i(E) = − 14 (E2 − 2E), E ∈ [0, 1],MK.1.ii(E) = − 14 (E2 − 2E), E ∈ [0, 1],{ MK.2(E) = − 14 (E2 − 2E), E ∈ [0, 0.5],MK.2(E) = − 14 (E2 − 1), E ∈ [0.5, 1],MK.3.i(E) = − 14 (E2 − 1), E ∈ [0, 1],MK.3.ii(E) = − 14 (E2 − 1), E ∈ [0, 1].
(20)
tv∗K.1.i(E) = E
2+9E−21
12(E−2) , E ∈ [0, 1],
tv∗K.1.ii(E) = 34 , E ∈ [0, 1],
tv∗K.2(E) = 12 , E ∈ [0, 1],
tv∗K.3.i(E) = 14 , E ∈ [0, 1],
tv∗K.3.ii(E) = E
2+E+1
12(E+1) , E ∈ [0, 1].
(21)
Rule K.1 has two candidate rules, K.1.i and K.1.ii, to
map each IAk1 = POSITIV Ek to O1 = LARGEST and
O2 = LARGE, respectively. These two rules reflect different
levels of a large trust that (POSITIV E)k can result in. As
shown in Figs. 6(a)-6(b), rule K.1.i has the ability to convert
any of the E to a higher tv∗(E) andMP(E) than rule K.1.ii.
That is, candidate rule K.1.i can be used as rule K.1 when
the value POSITIV EK of qualitative social attribute Ak=K
has a stronger possibility of leading to a larger trust value.
Similarly, rule K.3 uses K.3.i and K.3.ii, which indicate
(NEGATIV E)k can lead to different degrees of small trust.
Fig. 6(c) and 6(d) demonstrate that the rule K.3.ii can map all
the E to smaller tv∗(E) andMP(E) values than the rule K.3.i.
Therefore, there is a tendency to set rule K.3 as K.3.ii if the
value NEGATIV EK of qualitative social attribute Ak=K
has a stronger possibility of leading to a smaller trust value.
STor is capable of including an unlimited number of qual-
itative and quantitative social attributes in the conversion of
the trust value. Table 1 lists 10 possible qualitative social
attributes that come from popular social networks on the
Internet, including Facebook, LinkedIn, MSN, and QQ. It
also details which qualitative values taken from them can be
classified into particular IAkp . More qualitative social attributes
can be included in STor even if they are not listed in the table.
4.4 Example of trust value calculation
In this example, only E1 = freq (i.e., the communication
frequency between two friends) and E2 = time (i.e.,
the duration of their friendship) are considered as
quantitative social attributes. Assuming that the same weight,
pi1 = pi2 = 0.5, is assigned to each of them, then E between
entities i and j in social network Ss can be calculated as
Esi→j = (E
s
i→j(freq) + E
s
i→j(time))/2 according to Eqn. (4).
Here, Esi→j(freq) = Esi→j(freq)/max
p∈F si
(Esi→p(freq)),
Esi→j(time) = Esi→j(time)/max
p∈F si
(Esi→p(time)).
In social network Ss, only qualitative social attributes A1 =
Major and A2 = Relationship are considered. Figs. 5(c)-
5(d) illustrate the input fuzzy sets with their membership
functions for these two attributes. Their fuzzy rules are defined
below:
Rule 1.1
IF Major belongs to SECURITY-RELATED,
THEN Trust Value is LARGE.
Rule 1.2
IF Major belongs to COMPUTER-RELATED,
THEN Trust Value is NORMAL.
Rule 1.3
IF Major belongs to OTHERS,
THEN Trust Value is SMALL.
Rule 2.1
IF Relationship belongs to RELATIVE,
THEN Trust Value is LARGEST.
Rule 2.2
IF Relationship belongs to SCHOOLMATE,
THEN Trust Value is NORMAL.
Rule 2.3
IF Relationship belongs to STRANGER,
THEN Trust Value is SMALLEST.
In this definition, rules 1.1 and 1.3 adopt respective candidate
rules k.1.ii and k.3.i, while rule 2.1 and 2.3 implement
respective candidates k.1.i and k.3.ii. This is due to social
attribute A2 = Relationship possessing a stronger ability to
affect the trust value.
Figs. 7(a)-7(b) show the process of calculating the trust
value through the input independent fuzzy model based on
both qualitative and quantitative social attributes. Consider
entity i’s two friends, entities j1 and j2, entity j1 is a relative
and majors in network security while entity j2 is a stranger
and majors in computer science. If both of them have the same
Esi→j1 = Esi→j2 = 0.75 with respect to entity i, the relative
(i.e., j1) will achieve a trust value of tvsi→j1(0.75) = 0.8313
while the stranger (i.e., j2) will only receive a trust value of
tvsi→j2(0.75) = 0.375.
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TABLE 1
Qualitative social attributes from existing social networks.
k Qualitative Attribute (Ak) IAk1 = (POSITIV E)k I
Ak
2 = (NEUTRAL)
k IAk3 = (NEGATIV E)k Source Social Network
1 Major SECURITY-RELATED COMPUTER-RELATED OTHERS Facebook, LinkedIn
2 Relationship RELATIVE SCHOOLMATE STRANGER Facebook, LinkedIn, MSN
3 Career SECURITY-RELATED COMPUTER-RELATED OTHERS Facebook, LinkedIn
4 Recommendation POSITIVE NONE NEGATIVE LinkedIn
5 Citizenship FELLOW-CITIZEN NEUTRAL-CITIZEN ENEMY-CITIZEN Facebook, MSN, QQ
6 Geolocation SAME-CITY SAME-COUNTRY DIFFERENT-COUNTRY Facebook, QQ
7 Religion SAME RELIGION NO RELIGION DIFFERENT RELIGION Facebook
8 Political View SAME-VIEW NEUTRAL-VIEW DIFFERENT-VIEW Facebook
9 Hometown SAME-CITY SAME-COUNTRY DIFFERENT-COUNTRY Facebook
10 Position SAME-COMPANY NEUTRAL-COMPANY RIVAL-COMPANY Facebook,LinkedIn
... ... ... ... ... ...
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we first adopt the Markov random graph
to model the architecture of STor with 2, 500 entities and
deploy a testing network of Tor using PlanetLab nodes [50] to
implement STor network. As a consequence, we randomize
the social attributes of each entity in STor and calculate
the trust scores among them with the help of the input
independent fuzzy model and the trust propagation algorithm.
By conducting the evaluations in both simulation and ex-
periments over PlanetLab nodes, We show STor’s ability to
obtain secure anonymity and the impact on performance and
baseline anonymity. Moreover, a better scalability has been
demonstrated in STor compared to Tor.
5.1 Experiment Setup
5.1.1 Simulation
As reported at the 5th Oct. 2011 in [51], there are about
2, 389 public routers in the Tor network. As a result, we
simulate STor with 2, 500 user entities who run up STor
routers. Each entity can also act as a STor user to acquire
anonymity service from its friends. Following the models
and methods presented in [52], we use the Markov random
graph model (i.e., P* model with the Markov dependency)
to represent the underlying friendship graph G in STor. In
accordance with [52], the friendship between two entities is
established with an exponential family of distributions yielded
by the Hammersley-Clifford theorem. Particularly, we follow
the trilogy papers [53]–[55] to select parameters in these
exponential family of distributions. In this simulation setup,
we finally establish the graph G of STor with 2, 500 friendship
circles Fi, where, 1974 ≤ ||Fi|| ≤ 1981. Beside that, Each
entity is associated with a value ranging in (0,10MB] as its
bandwidth of the Tor or STor router.
5.1.2 PlanetLab Platform
To evaluate STor using the Internet, a private Tor network was
set up in PlanetLab platform [50]. 101 PlanetLab nodes were
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Fig. 8. Trust value for different Relationship and Major.
randomly chosen from around the globe and installed with the
Tor (V0.2.1.26). A node in Japan (133.15.59.1) was chosen as
the directory server and a node in Taiwan (140.109.17.181)
was chosen as the an onion proxy. The remaining 99 nodes
were set up as onion routers, which reported bandwidths from
21.9KB to 336.3KB to the directory server. The configuration
option “TestingTorNetwork” was set to 1 to allow the nodes to
work as an independent private Tor network. In addition, the
function smartlist choose by bandwidth() in Tor’s source
code was modified to bypass the existing circuit selection
algorithm and insert a new selection method in line with
Eq. (3). We have disabled the uptime based policies for exit
and entry nodes in the Tor as attackers are easy to bypass
them by setting up malicious routers for a period of time to
receive trust. As a consequence, we choose 100 entities from
the friendship graph G, which is generated in Section 5.1.1.
These entities include at least one friendship circle Fi with
||Fi|| = 99. Finally, we apply these entities to STor network
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in PlanetLab nodes.
5.2 Turst Score Calculation
The input independent fuzzy model, defined in section 4.2, is
used to initialize the trust value in each directed link on the
graph G that is generated in Section 5.1.1. Only qualitative
social attributes A1 = Major and A2 = Relationship are
considered in this case and the fuzzy rules defined in section
4.4 are adopted directly. Therefore, tv∗(E) can be calculated
according to Eq.(10) as tv∗(E) = MP1.p1(E)+MP2.p2(E)M1.p1(E)+M2.p2(E) , for
all rules (1.p1 + 2.p2), p1, p2 ∈ [1, 2, 3]. Fig. 8 demonstrates
the trust values calculated by using the input independent
fuzzy model for different social attributes. A relative who
majors in network security obtains trust values ranging in
around 0.81 to more than 0.83, but a stranger with an security
major only receives trust values from less than 0.2 to about
0.75. The relative always receives higher trust values than
the stranger. When we consider another stranger who majors
in literature arts (i.e., belongs to OTHERS), the trust values
drop to the range of [0.16, 0.19]. Moreover, with E (i.e., the
values of the quantitative social attributes) increasing, the trust
value never decreases. We can thus observe that a higher trust
value will be obtained by the friend whose social attributes
lead to more trustworthy. We therefore demonstrate that the
input independent fuzzy model can correctly and effectively
convert both quantitative and qualitative social attributes into
trust values.
In our experiment, we randomize the values of the quan-
titative and qualitative social attributes between each two
friends. After calculating the trust values by using the input
independent fuzzy model, we adopt the trust propagation
algorithm, which is proposed in Section 3.3, to generate the
trust scores of each entity’s friends or friends of friends.
5.3 Experiment to Assess Secure Anonymity
To evaluate the secure anonymity of Tor and STor, two
different implementations of Tor and STor are considered and
outlined in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Different Implementations of Tor and STor.
Implementation Description
Original Tor Tor routers with higher self-reported bandwidth are malicious
Opportunistic Tor Random Tor routers are considered to be malicious
Practical STor Friends with smaller trust score are more likely to set up malicious routers
Theoretical STor Friendship circle excludes malicious routers
Originally, Tor routers self-report their available bandwidth
to directory servers for circuit establishment and attackers
can thus simply announce high bandwidth in order to launch
attacks. We regard this implementation as Original Tor, in
which routers with higher bandwidth are considered to be
malicious. This implementation illustrates the minimum secure
anonymity obtained by Tor. To mitigate the affects caused by
the falsely high bandwidth announcement, an opportunistic
bandwidth measurement algorithm has been proposed [27],
[56]. Instead of the self-reporting approach, the opportunistic
method allows directory servers to measure the authentic
bandwidth provided by Tor routers. Therefore, random routers
are considered to be malicious in this implementation, called
Opportunistic Tor.
In STor, users utilize social networks to select trustwor-
thy routers from their friendship circles. Although friendship
circles cannot guarantee to exclude all the malicious routers,
friends with smaller trust score are more likely to set up mali-
cious routers or possess vulnerable routers. Since STor allows
users to establish circuits by taking the trust into consideration,
we use Practical STor, where routers with smaller trust score
are more likely to be malicious, to demonstrate the expected
implementation of STor. In contrast, the Theoretical STor,
in which malicious routers are excluded by users’ friendship
circle, is used to show STor with the theoretically maximum
secure anonymity.
5.3.1 Secure Anonymity in Simulation
In the simulation, we conduct the experiments in four different
malicious routers occupancies, representing 5%, 10%, 15%
and 20% candidate routers are malicious respectively. We
regard a round of simulation as an user selecting a router in
1000 times and use the ratio of malicious routers to selected
routers, denoted as RMR, in each round to measure secure
anonymity. Therefore, smaller RMR indicates better secure
anonymity. Particularly, RMR = 0 leads to the maximum
secure anonymity.
To evaluate the secure anonymity, we conduct 1000 rounds
of simulation in different implementations of Tor and STor
over different malicious routers occupancies. Note that Prac-
tical STor fixes both ω, a parameter defined in Eqn.(3), and
tsh, a threshold defined in section 3.5.2, to 0 in this evaluation.
Figs. 9(a)-9(d) show the CDF of secure anonymity, measured
by RMR, for different implementations of Tor and STor.
Among Original Tor, Opportunistic Tor and Practical STor,
although their secure anonymity decreases when the malicious
routers occupancy climbs from 5% to 20%, Practical STor
always shows much better secure anonymity than the other
two (e.g., smaller than one tenth of RMR compared with
that of Original Tor). Particularly, Practical STor gives out
approximately RMR = 0 distribution when 5% candidate
routers are malicious, thus demonstrating Practical STor can
achieve around the maximum secure anonymity when the
malicious routers occupancy is small. Beside that, Theoretical
STor is constant to show the maximum secure anonymity (i.e.,
RMR = 0) regardless the malicious routers occupancies. That
is because malicious routers are excluded by friendship circles.
STor uses ω, a parameter defined in Eqn.(3), to balance the
secure anonymity and performance for the trust-based routers
selection. A large ω puts more weight to bandwidth, but a
small ω has more weight to the trust score. According to en-
tities with different trust score obtaining different bandwidth,
we have two cases listed in Table 3. The Best Case is for
entities outside of the friendship circle receive low bandwidth
and friends with high trust score possess high bandwidth
routers inside the friendship circle, while the Worst Case is for
entities outside of the friendship circle have high bandwidth
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Fig. 9. The Ratio of Malicious Routers to Selected Routers (i.e., RMR) of Tor and STor in Different Implementations.
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Fig. 10. The Ratio of Malicious Routers to Selected Routers of Practical STor in Different ω.
TABLE 3
Different Cases for Trust Score and Bandwidth in Each Router.
Case Description
the Best Case Entities outside of the friendship circle possess low bandwidth routers and highly trusted friends with high bandwidth routers inside the friendship circle
the Worst Case Entities outside of the friendship circle possess high bandwidth routers and highly trusted friends with low bandwidth routers inside the friendship circle
and friends with high trust score obtain low bandwidth routers
inside the friendship circle.
In the evaluation of ω, tsh is set to 0. Figs. 10(a) and
10(b) show the RMR for the Best Case and the Worst Case in
Practical STor with different ω when 5% Candidate Routers
are Malicious. With ω growing up from 0 to 1, the RMR is
sharply increasing from less than 0.5% to around 10% in the
Worst Case, whereas theRMR is slightly increased in the Best
Case. Figs. 10(c) and 10(d) illustrate the similar result when
20% Candidate Routers are Malicious. The effectiveness of ω
in balancing the secure anonymity and performance for these
two cases will be detailed in Section 5.4.
To obtain better secure anonymity in Practical STor at the
cost of baseline anonymity, the trustworthy friendship circle,
defined in Section 3.5.2, can be used. More precisely, a trust
score threshold, ths, can filter out friends with smaller trust
score, which are more likely to deploy malicious or vulnerable
routers. In the evaluation of tsh, ω is set to 0. Figs. 11(a)-
11(d) illustrate the secure anonymity, measured by RMR, in
Practical STor when malicious routers occupancy is 5%, 10%,
15% and 20%. Coupled with tsh growing up from 0 to 0.035,
the RMR drops to around 0%, even in the case that 20%
candidate routers are malicious. We therefore observe that
higher tsh leads to better secure anonymity. The corresponding
impact caused by tsh to the baseline anonymity will be
elaborated in Section 5.5.
5.3.2 Secure Anonymity in Experiments over PlanetLab
To conduct the experiments over PlanetLab platform, we
modify the source code of Tor (V0.2.1.26) to let the onion
proxy request to form circuits automatically and allow the
directory server to record which routers are used to establish
which circuits. The structure of Tor and STor have been
generated in Section 5.1.2. Unlike the simulation, we regard
a round of PlanetLab experiment as an user forming a circuit
with 3 routers in 1000 times and use the ratio of malicious
circuits to formed circuits, denoted asRMC, to measure secure
anonymity. We consider a circuit as malicious if at least one
router in this circuit is malicious.
Fig. 12(a) shows the secure anonymity, measured by RMC,
for Original Tor, Opportunistic Tor, Practical STor and The-
oretical STor when 20% candidate routers are malicious.
Practical STor obtains less than one fifth of RMC in the
comparison with Opportunistic Tor and less than one eighth
of RMC compared with Original Tor, thus demonstrating
much better secure anonymity. Theoretical STor still stays at
RMC = 0 as friendship circles exclude any malicious routers.
Figs. 12(b) and 12(c) give out the secure anonymity for the
Best and Worst cases in different ω when malicious routers
occupancy is 20%. When ω increases from 0 to 1, the RMC
grows up from less than 10% to around 30% in the Best
Case but to more than 70% in the Worst Case. The balance
between the secure anonymity and performance for these two
cases over PlanetLab will be detailed in Section 5.4. Fig. 12(d)
illustrates that better secure anonymity is achieved with higher
tsh, which filters more friends with low trust score. We obtain
the similar RMC for tsh = 0.005, 0.015 and 0.025, because
there are seldom friends with trust score between 0.005 and
0.025 in the friendship circle.
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Fig. 11. The Ratio of Malicious Routers to Selected Routers (i.e., RMR) of Practical STor in Different tsh.
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Fig. 12. The Ratio of Malicious Circuits to Formed Circuits (i.e., RMC) Obtained from PlanetLab Nodes when 20%
Candidate Routers are Malicious.
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Fig. 13. The Average Bandwidth per 1000 Selected Routers in Simulation (MBytes) and Experiments over PlanetLab
Nodes (Kbytes).
100 700 1300 1900 2500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
Size of STor
||F
i||
(a) Size of Friendship Circle (i.e., ||Fi||) in
different Size of STor.
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
0
20
40
60
80
tsh
||T
F i|
|
(b) Size of Trustworthy Friendship Circle
(i.e., ||TFi||) in different tsh when the
Size of STor is 100.
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
200
400
600
800
1000
tsh
||T
F i|
|
(c) Size of Trustworthy Friendship Circle
(i.e., ||TFi||) in different tsh when the
Size of STor is 1300.
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
500
1000
1500
2000
tsh
||T
F i|
|
(d) Size of Trustworthy Friendship Circle
(i.e., ||TFi||) in different tsh when the
Size of STor is 2500.
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5.4 Experiment to Assess Performance
5.4.1 Performance in Simulation
In the simulation of performance, each router is randomly
assigned with a value in (0,10MB] as its bandwidth. The
average bandwidth for each round of simulation is calculated
as the average value among 1000 selected routers. Figs. 13(a)
and 13(b) show the CDF of the average bandwidth for Tor
and Practical STor over different ω in the Best and Worst
Cases. Since the friendship circle excludes routers with large
bandwidth in the Worst Case but eliminates small bandwidth
ones in the Best Case, Practical STor with ω = 1 (i.e.,
selecting routers solely based on bandwidth in Practical STor)
obtains smaller bandwidth distribution than Tor for the Worst
Case, whereas larger bandwidth distribution for the Best Case.
Therefore, it is necessary for users to encourage more friends
with the ability to set up high bandwidth routers to participate
in STor when their friendship circle meets the Worst Case.
With the ω increasing from 0 to 1, the average bandwidth of
Practical STor decreases from about 8MB to around 6.5MB in
the Best Case while grows up from less than 2MB to around
5MB in the Worst Case. In comparison with Figs. 10(c) and
10(d), we can therefore observe that STor achieves the same
trend of secure anonymity and performance for the Best Case,
while ω can help users obtain better anonymity in the sacrifice
of performance or vice versa. Particularly, lower ω leads to
better performance (i.e., higher average bandwidth) and better
secure anonymity (i.e., lower RMR) in Figs. 13(a) and 10(c),
respectively. That is because the rate of trust score’s variance is
a little bit larger than that of bandwidth’s variance in our social
network model and larger rate of the variance leads to both
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better performance and secure anonymity in the Best Case.
Note that, if the rate of bandwidth’s variance is larger than that
of trust score’s variance, larger ω obtains better performance
and secure anonymity in the Best Case.
5.4.2 Performance in Experiments over PlanetLab
For the performance evaluation over PlanetLab platform, we
regard the average bandwidth for each round as the average
value among 1000 formed circuits. We consider the lowest
bandwidth among 3 routers in a circuit as the bandwidth of
this circuit. In Fig. 13(c), the average bandwidth of Practical
STor is decreased from about 80KB to less than 65KB when
the ω increases from 0 to 1 in the Best Case. By contrast, 13(d)
shows an escalating trend of the average bandwidth in Practical
STor with the ω growing up in the Worst Case. By comparing
Figs. 12(b) and 12(c), we can see that STor achieves the same
variation of secure anonymity and performance for the Best
Case and larger rate of the variance leads to better results in
this case. ω, on the other hand, can be used to help users
obtain better anonymity at the cost of performance and vice
versa for the worst case. It is in accordance to the simulation
results. Unlike that, experiments over PlanetLab nodes show
that Tor obtains a similar bandwidth distribution as Practical
STor with ω = 1. That is because, according to the setup that
is elaborated in Section 5.1.2, the owners of Tor routers over
PlanetLab platform are all belong to the friendship circle of
STor in our experiments.
5.5 Experiment to Assess Baseline Anonymity and
Scalability
Both baseline anonymity and scalability can be measured by
the number of candidate routers. A large number of candidate
routers provides a better baseline anonymity, but leads to a
worse scalability. STor confine candidate routers to users’
(trustworthy) friendship circle, thus ||Fi|| and ||TFi|| are
effective to reflect the baseline anonymity and scalability of
STor. In this evaluation, the model used in Section 5.1.1
is adopted to simulate STor with different number of user
entities. The structure of STor in each size is generated for
100 times.
Fig. 14(a) demonstrates that, although ||Fi|| proportionally
grows up when the size of STor increases from 100 to 2500,
the size of STor retains to be larger than ||Fi|| (i.e., ||Fi||
is around 80% to the size of STor in our model). As a
result, STor receives a reduction in its baseline anonymity
but an improvement for its scalability. However, the baseline
anonymity of STor can be enhanced with the inflation of STor.
For instance, as STor with 2500 entities obtains an average of
2000 friends in Fi, it shows the similar baseline anonymity as
Tor with 2000 candidate routers.
As shown in Figs. 14(b)-14(d), the ||TFi|| keeps a de-
creasing trend when tsh = 0 grows up to tsh = 0.1 in
STor with 100, 1300 and 2500 user entities. By comparing
with Fig. 11, which shows large tsh helps STor obtain better
secure anonymity, we can thus observe that tsh is able to
help balance the secure anonymity (and the scalability) with
the baseline anonymity. Particularly, even when 20% candidate
routers are malicious, tsh = 0.035 can help STor reach around
the theoretically maximum secure anonymity (i.e.,RMR = 0).
Meanwhile, this tsh = 0.035 facilitate STor with 2500 entities
obtain a similar baseline anonymity as Tor with 1600 candidate
routers.
6 RELATED WORK
Malicious router based attacks, such as correlation attacks
[16]–[21], congestion attacks [22], disclosure attacks [23]
and latency based client location attacks [24] etc., have
demonstrated severe threats to the state-of-the-art anonymity
networks. To launch these attacks, at least one malicious
router is required to observe or manipulate the relayed traffic.
Particularly, the anonymity networks suffers a fundamental
limit in protecting the baseline anonymity when attackers
possess sufficient malicious routers to observe the traffic [57].
To evade malicious routers, some pioneer mechanisms have
been proposed [25], [27], [56], [58], [59]. Tor uses guard
routers at the entry point and selects exit routers accord-
ing to the exit node policy to circumvent malicious routers
[25]. This method relies on a group of directory servers to
check each routers’ credibility only according to their up-
time. Furthermore, an opportunistic bandwidth measurement
algorithm has been proposed to replace the existing self-
reporting method [27], [56], thus helping Tor users reduce
the hurt caused by malicious routers that announce false
bandwidth. Some reputation systems [58], [59], on the other
hand, are designed to verify the correctness of each router in
MIX Cascade networks, thus potentially detecting malicious
routers and making the circuits more reliable. However, these
mechanisms cannot help anonymity networks achieve trust-
based anonymous communication, because they have not taken
trust into consideration when selecting routers.
A pioneer security analysis for the Onion Routing has
implicitly indicated the necessary of trust-based routing al-
gorithm [60]. Furthermore, by understanding the importance
of the trust, the adversary models and routing algorithms
for the trust-based anonymous communication have been
demonstrated [12], [13]. Unlike these studies that focus on
why the trust is necessary for anonymous communication,
STor is a practical solution on how to introduce the trust to
anonymous communication. Beside that, many studies [9]–
[11] have appeared to use peer-to-peer approaches for scal-
able anonymous communication. They mainly focus on the
design of anonymous P2P lookup mechanisms in the scalable
architecture. Unlike that, the social network based trust model
introduces trust-based scalability to anonymity networks.
A number of fuzzy model based approaches have been
proposed to calculate the trust according to quantitative social
properties and propagate the trust over the semantic web social
networks [61]–[65]. However, these studies calculate trust by
using the traditional fuzzy model, thus loosing the function-
ality to convert the qualitative social attributes. Moreover, a
basic model for the propagation of trust and distrust over a
trust graph is proposed by [66], as well as the Friend-to-Friend
networks (e.g., [67], [68]) have been designed to use the trust
from real-world social networks for data sharing. STor, on the
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other hand, introduces trust and trust propagation to anonymity
networks from the real-world social networks.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a novel social network based trust model for
trust-based anonymous communication. This model determine
trust relationships from real-world social networks. More
precisely, an input independent fuzzy model has been devised
and used to convert both quantitative and qualitative social
attributes into trust values in various social networks. We
also propose a trust propagation algorithm to propagate trust
over the anonymity networks. By applying this trust model
to the Tor network, we have designed STor, a social network
based Tor. Extensive experimental results have demonstrated
that STor is effective in helping users circumvent malicious
routers in a distributed style. With the help of trusted friends,
STor users obtain secure anonymity without inducing severe
performance and baseline anonymity degradation. This social
network based trust model can be widely adopted to introduce
trust to other anonymity networks.
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APPENDIX A
Rule K.1.i
For a single social attribute, Ak=K , with its matched rule,
K.1.i, input fuzzy set IAk=K1 is mapped to output fuzzy set
O1. Based on Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), µIAk=K1 (E) = E , E ∈
[0, 1] and µO1(tv) = 4 × tv − 3, tv ∈ [0.75, 1]. Thus,
µK.1.i(E , tv) can be computed according to Eq. (7):
µK.1.i(E , tv) =
{ E , E+34 ≤ tv ≤ 1
4× tv − 3, 34 ≤ tv ≤ E+34E ∈ [0, 1], tv ∈ [0.75, 1].
As ρq=1 = 2 is defined in Eq. (18), MPK.1.i(E) can be
calculated according to Eq. (8) as:
MPK.1.i(E) =
∫ E+3
4
3
4
(tv × ρq=1 × (4× tv − 3))d(tv)
+
∫ 1
E+3
4
(tv × ρq=1 × E)d(tv) = − 148 (E3 + 9E2 − 21E).
Considering Eq. (9), MK.1.i(E) can be determined to be:
MK.1.i(E) =
∫ 1
E+3
4
(ρq=1 × E)d(tv)
+
∫ E+3
4
3
4
(ρq=1 × (4× tv − 3))d(tv) = − 14 (E2 − 2E).
Therefore, Eq. (11) can be used to calculate tv∗K.1.i(E) as:
tv∗K.1.i(E) = MPK.1.i(E)MK.1.i(E) = E
2+9E−21
12(E−2) .
Rule K.1.ii
For a single social attribute, Ak=K , with its matched rule,
K.1.ii, input fuzzy set IAk=K1 is mapped to output fuzzy set
O2. Based on Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), µIAk=K1 (E) = E , E ∈
[0, 1], µO2(tv) = 4× tv − 2, tv ∈ [0.5, 0.75] and µO2(tv) =
4−4×tv, tv ∈ [0.75, 1]. Thus, µK.1.ii(E , tv) can be computed
according to Eq. (7) as:
µK.1.ii(E , tv) =

4× tv − 2, 12 ≤ tv ≤ E+24
E , E+24 ≤ tv ≤ 4−E4
4− 4× tv, 4−E4 ≤ tv ≤ 1E ∈ [0, 1], tv ∈ [0.5, 1].
As ρq=2 = 1 is defined in Eq. (18), MPK.1.ii(E) can be
calculated according to Eq. (8) as:
MPK.1.ii(E) =
∫ E+2
4
1
2
(tv × ρq=2 × (4× tv − 2))d(tv)
+
∫ 4− E4
E+2
4
(tv × ρq=2 × E)d(tv)
+
∫ 1
4−E
4
(tv × ρq=2 × (4− 4× tv))d(tv) = − 316 (E2 − 2E).
Considering Eq. (9), MK.1.ii(E) can be determined to be:
MK.1.ii(E) =
∫ E+2
4
1
2
(ρq=2 × (4× tv − 2))d(tv)
+
∫ 4− E4
E+2
4
(ρq=2 × E)d(tv)
+
∫ 1
4−E
4
(ρq=2 × (4− 4× tv))d(tv) = − 14 (E2 − 2E).
Therefore, Eq. (11) can be used to calculate tv∗K.1.ii(E) as:
tv∗K.1.ii(E) = MPK.1.ii(E)MK.1.ii(E) = 34 .
Rule K.2
For a single social attribute, Ak=K , with its matched rule,
K.2, input fuzzy set IAk=K2 is mapped to output fuzzy set O3.
Based on Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), µIAk=K2
(E) = E , E ∈ [0, 0.5],
µIAk=K2
(E) = 1−E , E ∈ [0.5, 1], µO3(tv) = 4× tv−1, tv ∈
[0.25, 0.5] and µO2(tv) = 3− 4× tv, tv ∈ [0.5, 0.75]. Thus,
µK.2(E , tv) can be computed according to Eq. (7) when E ∈
[0, 0.5] as:
µK.2(E , tv) =

4× tv − 1, 14 ≤ tv ≤ E+14
E , E+14 ≤ tv ≤ 3−E4
3− 4× tv, 3−E4 ≤ tv ≤ 34E ∈ [0, 0.5], tv ∈ [0.25, 0.75].
And when E ∈ [0.5, 1] as
µK.2(E , tv) =

4× tv − 1, 14 ≤ tv ≤ 2−E4
1− E , 2−E4 ≤ tv ≤ 2+E4
3− 4× tv, 2+E4 ≤ tv ≤ 34E ∈ [0.5, 1], tv ∈ [0.25, 0.75].
As ρq=3 = 1 is defined in Eq. (18), MPK.2(E) can be
calculated according to Eq. (8) as follows. When E ∈ [0, 0.5]:
MPK.2(E) =
∫ E+1
4
1
4
(tv × ρq=3 × (4× tv − 1))d(tv)
+
∫ 3− E4
E+1
4
(tv × ρq=3 × E)d(tv)
+
∫ 3
4
3−E
4
(tv × ρq=3 × (3− 4× tv))d(tv) = − 18 (E2 − 2E).
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And when E ∈ [0.5, 1]:
MK.2(E) =
∫ 2−E
4
1
4
(tv × ρq=3 × (4× tv − 1))d(tv)
+
∫ 2+E
4
2−E
4
(tv × ρq=3 × (1− E))d(tv)
+
∫ 3
4
2+E
4
(tv × ρq=3 × (3− 4× tv))d(tv) = − 18 (E2 − 1).
Considering Eq. (9), MK.2(E) can be determined as below.
When E ∈ [0, 0.5]:
MK.2(E) =
∫ E+1
4
1
4
(ρq=3 × (4× tv − 1))d(tv)
+
∫ 3− E4
E+1
4
(ρq=3 × E)d(tv)
+
∫ 3
4
3−E
4
(ρq=3 × (3− 4× tv))d(tv) = − 14 (E2 − 2E).
And when E ∈ [0.5, 1]:
MK.2(E) =
∫ 2−E
4
1
4
(ρq=3 × (4× tv − 1))d(tv)
+
∫ 2+E
4
2−E
4
(ρq=3 × (1− E))d(tv)
+
∫ 3
4
2+E
4
(ρq=3 × (3− 4× tv))d(tv) = − 14 (E2 − 1).
Therefore, Eq. (11) can be used to calculate tv∗K.2(E) as
follows. When E ∈ [0, 0.5]:
tv∗K.2(E) = MPK.2(E)MK.2(E) =
− 18 (E2−2E)
− 14 (E2−2E)
= 12 .
And when E ∈ [0.5, 1]:
tv∗K.2(E) = MPK.2(E)MK.2(E) =
− 18 (E2−1)
− 14 (E2−1)
= 12 .
Thus tv∗K.2(E) = 12 , E ∈ [0, 1].
Rule K.3.i
For a single social attribute, Ak=K , with its matched rule,
K.3.i, input fuzzy set IAk=K3 is mapped to output fuzzy set
O4. Based on Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), µIAk=K3 (E) = 1−E , E ∈
[0, 1], µO4(tv) = 4 × tv, tv ∈ [0, 0.25] and µO4(tv) = 2 −
4× tv, tv ∈ [0.25, 0.5]. Thus, µK.3.i(E , tv) can be computed
according to Eq. (7) as:
µK.3.i(E , tv) =

4× tv, 0 ≤ tv ≤ 1−E4
1− E , 1−E4 ≤ tv ≤ 1+E4
2− 4× tv, 1+E4 ≤ tv ≤ 12E ∈ [0, 1], tv ∈ [0, 0.5].
As ρq=4 = 1 is defined in Eq. (18), MPK.3.i(E) can be
calculated according to Eq. (8) as:
MPK.3.i(E) =
∫ 1−E
4
0
(tv × ρq=4 × (4× tv))d(tv)
+
∫ 1−E
4
1+E
4
(tv × ρq=4 × (1− E))d(tv)
+
∫ 1
2
1+E
4
(tv × ρq=4 × (2− 4× tv))d(tv) = − 116 (1− E2).
Considering Eq. (9), MK.3.i(E) can be determined to be:
MK.3.i(E) =
∫ 1−E
4
0
(ρq=4 × (4× tv))d(tv)
+
∫ 1−E
4
1+E
4
(ρq=4 × (1− E))d(tv)
+
∫ 1
2
1+E
4
(ρq=4 × (2− 4× tv))d(tv) = − 14 (1− E2).
Therefore, Eq. (11) can be used to calculate tv∗K.3.i(E) as:
tv∗K.3.i(E) = MPK.3.i(E)MK.3.i(E) = 14 .
Rule K.3.ii
For a single social attribute, Ak=K , with its matched rule,
K.3.ii, input fuzzy set IAk=K3 is mapped to output fuzzy set
O5. Based on Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), µIAk=K3 (E) = 1−E , E ∈
[0, 1] and µO5(tv) = 1 − 4 × tv, tv ∈ [0, 0.25]. Thus,
µK.3.ii(E , tv) can be computed according to Eq. (7) as:
µK.3.ii(E , tv) =
{
1− E , 0 ≤ tv ≤ E4
1− 4× tv, E4 ≤ tv ≤ 14E ∈ [0, 1], tv ∈ [0, 0.25].
As ρq=5 = 2 is defined in Eq. (18), MPK.3.ii(E) can be
calculated according to Eq. (8) as:
MPK.3.ii(E) =
∫ E
4
0
(tv × ρq=5 × (1− E))d(tv)
+
∫ 1
4
E
4
(tv × ρq=4 × (1− 4× tv))d(tv) = − 148 (1− E3).
Considering Eq. (9), MK.3.ii(E) can be determined to be:
MK.3.ii(E) =
∫ E
4
0
(ρq=5 × (1− E))d(tv)
+
∫ 1
4
E
4
(ρq=4 × (1− 4× tv))d(tv) = − 14 (1− E2).
Therefore, Eq. (11) can be used to calculate tv∗K.3.ii(E) as:
tv∗K.3.ii(E) = MPK.3.ii(E)MK.3.ii(E) = E
2+E+1
12(E+1) .
